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Privatization  remains the most important outstanding item on the agenda of 
radical  reform in Poland. The “big bang” reform program  was designed to 
stabilize the  hyperinflation, free prices,  liberalize trade,  and restructure the 
foundations of the economy toward a market system. An integral part of this 
restructuring was to be the rapid privatization  of  the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), which overwhelmingly dominated the nonagricultural economy. 
In fact, little privatization  of  SOEs has taken  place.’ This is not due to a 
lack of ideas about how privatization  should be accomplished; there has now 
developed a minor industry in which economists propose and discuss privatiza- 
tion programs.2 Nor is it due to a lack of trying; the Polish government has 
attempted to implement several methods of privatization. This paper will sup- 
plement the discussion about privatization strategies with a review of the actual 
attempts to implement them. By doing so, it should become clearer why so 
little privatization has actually occurred. 
Two themes emerge. First, although much of the debate has focused on opti- 
The author thanks Kevin McDonald, Tony Levitas, his friends and colleagues at the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Privatization, and Jeffrey D. Sachs and Associates for many useful 
discussions, and especially Zanny Minton Beddoes for her invaluable help. He has also benefited 
from the remarks of conference participants. Mistakes and misjudgments remain his own. 
1. In this paper, I do not address the dramatic success that has been achieved in the growth of 
the private sector, particularly in construction, trade and other services, and the transfer of shops 
to private hands. These developments have resulted in an increase of the share of the private sector 
in GDP to more than half by  the middle of  1992. In industry, however, the share was still only 
about 19 percent. The vital topic of reform and privatization of the financial system is also not 
addressed here. For a fuller discussion of how privatization of state-owned enterprises fits into the 
general problem of economic transformation in Poland, see Berg and Blanchard (chap. 2 in vol. I). 
2. For discussions of Polish privatization, see, e.g., Dabrowski (1991), Dabrowski, Federowicz, 
and Levitas (1991). Gruszecki (1991), Kawalec (1992). Szomburg and Lewandowski (1990). and 
Winiecki (1992). For more general contexts, see Aslund (1990), Fischer (chap. 7 in vol.  I), Fryd- 
man and Rapaczynski (1992), Kornai (1991), and Stark (1990). 
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ma1 privatization schemes, in practice the issue has proved to be how to execute 
a minimally acceptable and feasible program. It is common to discuss priva- 
tization in terms of a set of goals, such as speed, effective ownership, equity, 
fiscal stability, avoidance of  excess dependence on foreigners, and low cost. 
The problem, however, seems to be not how best to reconcile competing goals 
but rather how to accomplish anything at all. What is striking in Poland is that, 
more than two years into the radical “big bang” program, the vast majority of 
state enterprises  have undergone  no ownership  transformation;  instead, the 
highly unsatisfactory initial structure has been maintained: the workers control 
but do not own the enterprises. 
If the current situation in the state-enterprise economy were satisfactory, this 
lack of action would be easier to understand. The current pattern of control of 
state enterprises, however, gives little cause for complacency.  As economic 
theory would suggest, the evidence implies that these enterprises are generally 
performing poorly. And, despite the huge budget deficits, political pressure is 
growing to help these enterprises with subsidies, looser credit, and trade pro- 
te~tion.~ 
The second theme is that the initial conditions and constraints have shaped 
what has been attempted and what has taken place. Section 9.1 isolates three 
constraints: the usual set of institutional weaknesses common to most LDCs, 
special problems associated with the revolutionary  “rules of the game,” and 
the existing  pattern  of  ownership rights.  Section 9.2 examines privatization 
efforts to date. Section 9.4 concludes. 
13.1  The Constraints on Privatization 
Poland shares with LDCs a set of well-known characteristics that make pri- 
vatization difficult. They include a lack of well-developed capital markets and 
related institutions such as banks, insurance companies, a functioning judicial 
system to resolve civil disputes, and property registries; a shortage of skilled 
and experienced personnel; weak administrative capacity, including a shortage 
of infrastructure such as copy machines and telephones; a difficult macroeco- 
nomic environment; and state enterprises in generally poor financial condition. 
In addition, Poland’s efforts to date have brought out a further set of problems 
whose influence is harder to appreciate but equally pervasive. This is the fact 
that the situation with regard to the rules of the game, in the broadest sense, is 
revolutionary. Laws are either new or newly enforced  after decades  of  dor- 
mancy. Customs and traditions of  behavior, especially  the bureaucratic,  are 
widely recognized as inappropriate to the new environment, while new prac- 
tices have not yet developed. Two points should be emphasized here. First, I 
am  not  referring  to some “socialist psychology”  where individuals  are  no 
3. For more discussion of these issues, see Berg and Blanchard (chap. 2 in vol. 1). For a discus- 
sion of restructuring problems in state enterprises, see McDonald (1992). 167  The Logistics of  Privatization in Poland 
longer capable of responding to  incentive^.^ Second, the problem is not pre- 
dominantly that the laws themselves do not exist but that they have never been 
enforced. Most of the commercial code and bankruptcy law, for example, dates 
from the 1930s (see Gray 1991). 
The problem lies rather in the lack of institutional development and in the 
complexity of the decisions involved in privatization. The habits and traditions 
that lower transaction costs by substituting for rigid rules do not exist5 As  a 
result, where rules are broken, especially in privatization transactions, cormp- 
tion is suspected.‘j Thus, each minor piece of a transaction, such as the publica- 
tion of a request for tender offers, requires the signature of the head of a depart- 
ment, who may be criminally liable if  there  turn  out to be  mistakes in  the 
advertisement. The result is that the Polish bureaucracy is in effect on a “work- 
to-rule’’ strike.’ 
The final and most important constraint on the privatization process is the 
initial structure of ownership rights. Understanding this requires a brief discus- 
sion of property rights in the state-owned enterprises. Polish state enterprises 
should not be confused with state-owned corporations in the West: they are 
not joint-stock corporations whose shares are controlled by agents of the state 
Treasury. They are also not administrative units of the bureaucracy. They are 
unique legal entities, subject to their own specific structures of ownership and 
control, with as much political legitimacy as almost any institution in Poland 
(see Breitkopf, Gorski, and Jaszczynski  199 1 ; Dabrowski,  Federowicz, and 
Levitas 1991; and Frydman and Wellisz 1991). 
Poland began decentralizing decision making to the enterprise level in the 
1950s, but the point of  departure for the current situation  is the  1981 State 
Enterprise Law, which in an emended form is still in effect. This law defined 
a state enterprise as “an autonomous,  self-managed  and self-financing  unit, 
possessing personality at law,” and gave to the self-management bodies, which 
are democratically elected workers’ councils, the power to appoint the manag- 
ing director, allocate profits, and plan production. The government kept only 
the power to create and liquidate enterprises, placing it in the hands of the 
branch ministry or “founding organ” responsible for the particular enterprise. 
This legal self-management was strongly qualified in practice by the nature 
of  the “shortage economy.” The central administration and the management 
retained real independent power, partly through the fact that the shortage econ- 
4. Where bureaucratic institutions are not involved, and where individual incentives are appro- 
priate, such as in the small private sector, entrepreneurs are starting businesses in the hundreds 
of thousands. 
5. On how ideology, customs. and tradition reduce transaction costs, see North (1981). 
6.  There is no direct evidence of actual corruption in privatization. However, there have been 
well-publicized scandals involving foreign debt management (“the FOZZ affair”), loopholes in 
certain import tariffs (“the alcohol affair”) and large-scale check kiting and related bribery of 
government officials (“the Art-B affair”). These have served to heighten an already high sensitivity. 
7. A type of industrial action, common in  public unions prohibited from more overt strikes, 
whereby all rules and regulations are followed blindly and no actual work gets done. 168  Andrew Berg 
omy made personal contacts in the government and with other firms critical 
for the functioning of  the firm in order to obtain inputs, subsidies, tax relief, 
and so on (see Kawalec  1992; and McDonald 1992). The administration and 
the Party  thus retained  central roles in appointing and influencing manage- 
ment. In the late 1980s, as reform continued and central planning receded, the 
power of the workers’ councils and managers vis a vis the state grew. 
The critical point was reached  in  1989 and  1990 with the collapse of the 
Communist regime. The financial relation between the state and the enterprise 
was clarified. The only remaining Treasury claim on profits was in the form of 
a proportional income tax and a “dividenda” payment based on the book value 
of capital in 1983. All remaining profits were left to the enterprise. The enter- 
prise was still ultimately  owned by  the state, but most important  aspects of 
ownership  had  by  now  been  carefully  and  clearly  allocated  to the  self- 
management bodies. 
The final collapse of the old state structure at the end of 1989 and the begin- 
ning of 1990 led to a strong affirmation of the power of the workers’ councils. 
New councils, elected in early 1990, proceeded to pass judgment on manage- 
ment in about half the firms, replacing some 40 percent of the managers re- 
viewed.8 
The growth in the stake of workers in the firm was more than a legal phe- 
nomenon. The shock troops of  the Solidarity revolution  were the industrial 
workers,  and  the  front line  in  the  confrontation  between  the  state  and  the 
people was the shop floor. As a result, the sense of attachment of workers to 
their  enterprise  should  not be underestimated.  For  example,  45 percent  of 
workers surveyed in  1987 and 67 percent in  1989, and 63 and 77 percent of 
managers, respectively, were in favor of  selling shares to workers, despite the 
fact that  most workers did not  “support private initiative” (CBOS  1989) in 
large state enterprises. Privatization of  large enterprises to workers was also 
the most popular type of  privatization  among the entire population.  For ex- 
ample, 80 percent of respondents to another survey agreed that “shares of pri- 
vatized state enterprises should always be sold first to their workers”  (CBOS 
1990). 
The upshot of this process is that workers are now the dominant force con- 
trolling the state-owned enterprise. Despite this power shift toward workers, 
however, management often maintains significant power because of informa- 
tion advantages or close contacts with suppliers, foreign partners, or even the 
government and because workers’ councils may be passive or ~o-opted.~  This 
granting of some sort of a stake in the firm to insiders has the advantage of 
creating a certain incentive for those who have the information to make effi- 
cient decisions. 
8. Help-wanted advertisements can be observed in Polish newspapers in which workers’ coun- 
cils announce that they are looking for experienced, skilled managing directors. 
9. There are often two, or even three, plant-level unions active in the enterprise, sometimes in 
conflict with the workers’ council. As a result, the Polish press speaks of  the firm being lost in the 
“Bermuda Triangle” of management, the workers’ council, and the unions. 169  The Logistics of  Privatization in Poland 
The situation is more complicated that the description given above implies. 
In addition to workers and management, the state retains significant power in 
the enterprise. While it has largely given up control of the enterprises, it has 
not relinquished the legal right to dispose of the assets of the enterprise. The 
need for ministerial approval of important transactions such as privatization or 
formation  of a joint venture confers influence. The government also retains 
some of its traditional power through control over the banking system and the 
budget. Finally, many enterprises  are in arrears on taxes, giving the state the 
power to force the firm into liquidation, as described below. 
This confused control structure results in feeble decision making in the en- 
terprise. The relative power of the various players (management, the workers’ 
council, the unions, the government, and possibly creditors such as state banks) 
varies widely from enterprise to enterprise. In general, the end result, however, 
is that any one of the stakeholders can block change, while concerted action 
requires consensus. One implication is that, in smaller enterprises, the insiders 
are more likely to cooperate and actively carry out adjustments,  whereas in 
large firms internal conflict and passivity are more common (see Dabrowski, 
Federowicz, and Levitas 1991; and McDonald 1992). 
This peculiar ownership and control structure has unfortunate implications 
for privatization: 
1. The current situation is extremely dangerous and probably unstable: real 
wages are rising, and profit rates have declined to the point where aggregate 
net profits were negative in the fourth quarter of 1991,  with direct implications 
for the budget, both because of lower accrued taxes and because of enterprise 
arrears to the government. The budget deficit for 1991 was running at 4.5 per- 
cent of  GDP, and arrears equaled 85 percent  of  this deficit. Taxes on wage 
increases  in excess of  government-established  norms constituted  the largest 
component of these unpaid liabilities. Prospects for the 1992 budget are worse. 
2. The withdrawal of the state has left current insiders with a powerful infor- 
mational advantage over the government as well as a strong incentive to try to 
preserve their current rights during privatization. One potential positive impli- 
cation is that those who control the firm have the information  and some of 
the incentives to behave efficiently. The looming threat of disenfranchisement 
through privatization  weakens these incentives and encourages irresponsible 
behavior. 
3. Insiders will resist disenfranchisement  except where the firm is in finan- 
cial  distress. The government  finds itself  making promises  of  financial and 
other support in its effort actively to privatize firms. 
The next section reviews the experience to date in the privatization of state- 
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13.2  Privatization Efforts to Date 
13.2.1  Spontaneous Privatization 
Given the constraints outlined above, it is not surprising that the first occur- 
rence of privatization was instigated and controlled by insiders. With the relax- 
ation of government control over the enterprise in the late 1980s, and as the end 
of the Communist era appeared, management found opportunities to privatize 
profits through so-called nomenklatura privatizations. In a typical transaction, 
the management and perhaps ministry officials would participate in a new pri- 
vate company that would enter into a joint venture with the state enterprise. 
Transfer pricing and other terms of the joint venture would ensure that profits 
would be transferred to the private company. 
Condemnation of these sorts of deals was widespread, and one of the Soli- 
darity government’s first reforms in late 1989 made liquidation of a state enter- 
prise mandatory in the event that “over half of the enterprise’s assets are com- 
posed of shares, other equity in joint-stock companies, or bonds, or have been 
transferred in usufruct to other parties on the basis of civil contracts” (Breit- 
kopf,  Gorski,  and Jaszczynskil991). The increased  power  of  the workers’ 
councils and unions also resulted in a curbing of nomenklatura privatizations. 
As the power in the firm has shifted from the nomenklatura to the stakehold- 
ers described above, a related form of spontaneous privatization has developed. 
In this case, assets are transferred to private hands with the agreement of  all 
interested parties, which would normally include workers and managers. For 
example, one wholesale distribution enterprise, with several hundred employ- 
ees, was largely dismantled and began to operate in private hands, probably 
without any transaction registered as privatization. The gas station was leased 
to employees, the trucks were sold, and a private company was using the park- 
ing lot and some of the office space. The arrangements may or may not have 
been legal, but probably no one with any power to interfere was unhappy. In 
another case, a warehouse that was part of a state farm was being used by  a 
local farmer to store animals prior to export, as part of a major private opera- 
tion. The state employee in charge of the warehouse was also an employee of 
the private company. 
By its nature, this sort of privatization is hard to observe, much less measure. 
It is probably  economically  efficient. If it is significant, it represents an im- 
portant qualifier both to the claim that little privatization has taken place and 
to the statistical evidence on the decline in employment and output in the state 
sector. Informal estimates from recent surveys suggest that perhaps one-third 
of enterprises have engaged in some sort of partial asset transfer to the private 
sector and that virtually all the assets from the burgeoning private sector come 
from the state sector.’O 
10. I am indebted to Tony Levitas for sharing preliminary results from current work in Poland. 
I rely heavily on his information both here and later, when I discuss outcomes in liquidated enter- 171  The Logistics of  Privatization in Poland 
It is not clear that this sort of privatization can form an important part of the 
overall process. It appears to be difficult to arrange in the larger state enter- 
prises. The privatization  of an asset in such an enterprise requires an arrange- 
ment within the company for distribution of the gains. If the asset is well de- 
fined (a pig farm belonging to a shoe factory, e.g.), it may be a natural outcome 
for those  working  with  the asset to appropriate  it. For integral parts  of the 
factory, however, the internal coalition may be difficult to form. In one case, a 
private company in Gdansk leased workshops and hired workers from one of 
the large state-owned shipyards at much higher (presumably efficiency) wages. 
This arrangement was halted by the workers in the state enterprise, who appar- 
ently objected on grounds of equity. 
13.2.2  The Law on Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises 
The alternative to spontaneous privatization  is active government interven- 
tion to privatize. The government gained the legal power to begin privatizing 
state enterprises with the passage of the Law on Privatization of  State Enter- 
prises on 1 August 1990 (see Center for Privatization 1990), and this continues 
to define the context for privatization in Poland.” 
This law was the culmination of a long and acrimonious debate. Initially, at 
the end of  1989, the  government  envisaged universal commercialization of 
state enterprises (Polish terminology  for the legal conversion  of state-owned 
enterprises into joint-stock companies owned by the state Treasury and subject 
to the commercial code). The government hoped to privatize these commer- 
cialized firms rapidly, primarily through  initial public offerings. There were 
several justifications for this approach: the desire to generate widespread share 
ownership for sociological and political reasons; a strong attachment to Anglo- 
Saxon-type capital markets, itself partly due to the influence of  aid-financed 
investment bankers and financial market specialists; and, more generally, the 
feeling that the valuation and sale of assets was the only “civilized” approach. 
The government’s intentions to commercialize “from above,” without workers’ 
council  approval, generated  strong resistance,  and the plan was abandoned. 
This was partly simple interest-group politics in the Sejm (the lower house of 
Parliament) and partly a widespread fear of nationalization, based on concerns 
that the state would run the enterprises no better than it had in the past and that 
Solidarity might take on characteristics of the former regime if given power 
over the enterprises.’* 
priscs. For further discussion of measurement of  the private sector and some estimates of biases 
in the meawrement of  output and consumption during transition, see Berg (1992). 
11. For a useful description of privatization mechanisms in Poland, see Madigan (1992). 
12. The main alternatives to the government plan in the Sejm were variations on the idea of 
worker self-management. Gruszecki (1991) argues that, while there was some real attraction for 
the worker-managemendemployee-stock-option-type plan, a dissatisfaction with the government 
approach of  selling enterprises generated  much  of  the resistance.  In the end, and  after some 
twenty-four versions, the final draft still assumed the case-by-case commercialization and sale 
of  enterprises. 172  Andrew Berg 
The law envisages two possible paths for the privatization of an enterprise. 
The first, capital privatization,  was intended in general for large enterprises. 
The second, liquidation, was intended for smaller enterprises and will be dis- 
cussed below. The first step in capital privatization is commercialization. This 
step normally requires the approval of the workers’ council, the management, 
and an assembly of employees.” With commercialization, a board of directors 
is appointed by the representative of the Treasury (now the minister of priva- 
tization). The workers appoint one-third of  the board. The 1981 State Enter- 
prise Law no longer applies to commercialized enterprises. In particular, the 
workers’ council loses its powers, and the management is responsible to the 
board.14 After commercialization, the Ministry of  Privatization  (MOP) is re- 
sponsible for privatization of the enterprise. The workers are given the right, 
however, to buy up to 20 percent of  shares at half price, subject to a limit on 
the total discount equal to one years’ wage. 
The second major path of privatization envisaged in the law is liquidation.lS 
Here, the basic idea is that the enterprise decides to privatize, the branch minis- 
try responsible for the enterprise agrees, the MOP concurs, and the liquidation 
is implemented by the branch ministry. The state enterprise ends its legal exis- 
tence, and there are three possible outcomes for the assets: (1) The assets are 
sold piece by piece by the responsible ministry. (2)  A new company is created 
between the Treasury and a private investor. (3) The management and employ- 
ees create a private firm and lease the assets (and the liabilities) of the enter- 
prise from the Treasury.” 
13.2.3 
Commercialization 
Implementation of the Privatization Law 
Commercialization is the necessary first step to capital privatization. Table 
13.1 gives the number of firms commercialized by  size facts and table 13.2 a 
sectoral breakdown. Some 244 enterprises have been commercialized since the 
law was passed (as of  the end of  1991). These represent about 10 percent of 
employment in the national economy. The government  strategy has been  to 
associate  commercialization  directly  with  privatization,  so, while  the  con- 
13. The law did provide that a majority of the Council of Ministers and the prime minister could 
compel an enterprise to commercialize without workers’ council approval. This power has not 
been exercised to  date. For explanations of this aspect of  the law, see PiywuJyzacja (Ministry of 
Privatization), nos. I, 4 (1991). 
14. A later addition to the law allows the loosening of wage controls in an effort to encourage 
commercialization. 
15. Confusingly, the State Enterprise Law of  1981 also envisages “liquidation” of state enter- 
prises that are delinquent on certain tax payments. This distinct type of liquidation will be dis- 
cussed separately below. 
16. The new private company must be created according to the commercial code, with a paid- 
in capital equal to at least 20 percent of the book value of the state enterprise. The law also defines 
some of  the terms of the lease. For legal commentaries on this aspect of the law, see Prywatyzacja, 
nos. 2,3  (1991). For further explanation, see esp. Madigan (1992). 173  The Logistics of  Privatization in Poland 
Table 13.1  Number of State Enterprises Commercialized and in Liquidation as 
of 31 December 1991 
Liquidations via  1981 
State Enterprise Law  Privatization Law 
Liquidations via 1990 
No. ofemployees  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Commercialized  Total 
Total  442  5  2  534  24  15  338  416  244  1 I94 
<200  324  4  0  371  15  8  159  190  8  569 
200-500  75  0  1  99  6  4  117  144  52  295 
>SO0  431  1643  36282  184  330 
Source: Ministry of  Privatization, Warsaw. 
Nore: Means of liquidation: (1) via sale of  property; (2) via contribution into company; (3) via 
leasing; (4) total. 
Table 13.2  Number of State Enterprises Commercialized or in Liquidation by 
Industrial Sector as of 31 December 1991 
Enterprises Transformed 
Total No. of  Liquidated  Commercialized  Total 
Remaining State 
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Source: Ministry of  Privatization, Warsaw. 
Note: The percentages indicate the ratio of  number of transformed enterprises to the number of 
remaining state enterprises. 
straints discussed above have influenced this process as well, I will not focus 
on them, except to summarize some tentative conclusions. 
First, it was not difficult to find board members. A training program devel- 
oped within the MOP has succeeded in producing enough candidates. There 
is no direct evidence, however, that boards intervene actively. MOP officials 
complain that important decisions require their direct intervention. It appears 
that boards tend to become advocates for the enterprise instead of agents of 
the owner (the Treasury).” Second, the enterprise and the government tend to 
17. For this reason, the placing of representatives of creditors, such as banks and other enter- 
prises, on the boards of commercialized companies is being considered. 174  Andrew Berg 
feel that the state is newly responsible for the enterprise. This is a logical result 
of the increased ownership rights of the government and an outgrowth of the 
implicit or explicit promises that the government makes to enterprises  in its 
efforts to get them to commercialize. 
Third,  some  evidence  points to an  increased  passivity  in  the  enterprise. 
There is apparently a fear on the part of the management that, since the govern- 
ment is now responsible for finding buyers, foreign partners, and so on, it is 
not a good idea to risk strikes or other disruptions  that might be caused by 
restructuring. The fact that the MOP will actively structure any eventual priva- 
tization means that the management has much less chance of benefiting from, 
for example, a joint venture than if it could negotiate and conclude the deal 
itself. 
The First Five lPOs 
In the year after the passage of the privatization law, the government focused 
its energies on the preparation of companies for initial public offering (IPO). 
The idea was to make the first privatizations so successful that the process 
would “snowball” and up to 100-200  enterprises could be processed and sold 
every year. However, the experience with the first five IPOs convinced almost 
everyone that additional methods of privatization were necessary. 
The selection of  companies was a long and politically difficult venture, in 
which a list of twenty companies in January 1990 was winnowed down a final 
five. These companies, with 23,000 total employees, were chosen as the best 
candidates by Western and Polish consultants, on criteria of quality of manage- 
ment, financial soundness, ability to export, and so on. They were offered to 
the public in November 1990. The five enterprises were successfully sold, al- 
though the subscription period had to be lengthened and a state-owned bank 
allowed to purchase shares in order to avoid undersubscription in some issues. 
Ultimately,  130,000 shareholders bought shares worth $3  1 million. The offer- 
ing of five large companies simultaneously has to be considered a success con- 
sidering the environment, but these transactions were expensive and, more im- 
portant, required tremendous allocation of government human resources. 
The achievement of  actually privatizing five companies in the Polish situa- 
tion and, in the process, creating some of the institutions of a capital market 
was remarkable. But the success has been mixed. Since the initial offering, at 
least two of the five have got into in serious difficulty, as real appreciation of 
the zloty and the elimination of CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assis- 
tance) trade have hit them hard. Share prices have fallen below the offering 
price in four of the five companies. The boards do seem to function reasonably 
well. But these boards have a high concentration of scarce talent, such as the 
president of a new development bank and department directors from the MOP. 
The companies still appeal to the MOP for help when in trouble as well, cash- 
ing in on implicit or explicit promises of  support. 
In a larger sense, the failure of the IPO approach was clear and acute. While 175  The Logistics of Privatization in Poland 
certain technical details could be better worked out in the future, nothing sug- 
gested that there would be a “snowball” acceleration of IPOs; the next round 
would clearly be as hard as the first. While some capacity had been built, the 
transaction  cost was unsustainable,  and public  enthusiasm  had fallen  in re- 
sponse to the poor stock market performance.  After all, only five had been 
done. Nonetheless,  the government continued to carry  out public offerings, 
and, since 1990, there have been another five full or partial public offers, in 
which some $33 million worth of  shares have been sold. (For a list of all firms 
privatized  through  capital  privatization,  see app. table  13A.  1  .)  In  addition, 
there have been  another sixteen enterprises  privatized through auctions  and 
tender offers. As table  13A.1 shows, the total value of  shares sold in these 
sixteen enterprises was about $142 million, with the companies valued at $228 
million. The largest of these were sold at least in part to foreign investors. 
The IPO approach has thus proved to be extremely slow. Advocates of alter- 
native approaches had already provided the reasons why the program could not 
be the primary vehicle for privatization. Until the end of 1990, however, there 
were always those who argued that the process was about to accelerate drasti- 
cally. It is thus instructive briefly to look at the reasons for the slow pace of 
public offers. 
The novelty and risk of the procedure compelled the government to promise 
good returns to investors and health and success to the companies involved. 
This made doing due diligence (verifying the health of the company, checking 
the balance sheet, etc.) even more arduous than the difficult environment would 
imply. The fact that afterward there would be diffuse ownership, together with 
the political exposure of the project, made it necessary to carry out any restruc- 
turing prior to privatization. The “snowball” concept exacerbated these prob- 
lems by raising the stakes enormously. 
In addition to the need to value the firm, all sorts of details slowed the pro- 
cess down. For  example,  the legal determination  of  all  the land-ownership 
claims and tax liabilities  of the enterprises  was a necessary prerequisite  for 
privatization  and required close cooperation from a large number of govern- 
ment bureaucrats  unaccustomed  to making legal statements.  In  addition, in 
some cases, complex “unofficial”  claims against the enterprise needed to be 
unraveled prior to privatization. For example, an enterprise  might have been 
providing free central heating to the local town for many years. The future of 
this relation would have to be negotiated prior to privatization. 
Sales to foreign investors illustrate many of the same problems as IPOs. In 
particular, they highlight the different agendas and relative bargaining power 
of insiders and the MOP. Managers are often the best equipped to locate and 
negotiate with foreigners. They know their own business and often the industry 
and may have long-term relationships with the foreign partners. They are gen- 
erally interested in preserving and strengthening their company, perhaps under 
workers’ council pressure. They may also be looking for some sort of “golden 
parachute” from the investor. The typical large direct foreign investment in the 176  Andrew Berg 
late  1980s, the joint venture,  was  thus often  a  sort of  nomenklatura  pnva- 
tization. 
The MOP recognized the inherent conflict of interest involved when manag- 
ers negotiate deals for state enterprises  and called for major foreign invest- 
ments to take place through capital privatization, with the Ministry of Priva- 
tization  taking  an  active  role  in  the  negotiations  and  making  the  final 
agreement. This did not prove effective. Managers have the incentive to negoti- 
ate quick and cheap deals, but ministry bureaucrats do not. Given the sums of 
money involved, the difficulties in valuation, and the fact that the need to sell 
to highly risk-averse foreign investors lowers the price, very few bureaucrats 
are willing to take the responsibility for deciding to accept an offer. Moreover, 
they face steep obstacles in overcoming the insider power of managers to con- 
duct legitimate tender procedures.’* 
As a result of these problems, many more deals have been announced than 
negotiated, and the big transactions have by and large not yet happened. 
The Sectoral Approach 
As a result of the difficulties with IPOs and the resultant demand for alterna- 
tives, and because  of  the difficulties the MOP had  in coping with potential 
foreign investors, the “sectoral privatization” approach gained favor in 199  1. 
This was intended to speed up the process and deal efficiently with the many 
problems with the IPOs and individual trade sales. The idea of  sectoral priva- 
tization was simply to process capital privatizations, especially trade sales to 
foreign investors, one industry at a time instead of one firm at a time. Thus, 
one financial adviser could be used for a sector instead of a firm (see Hermann 
1990).  There were five factors encouraging this approach: 
1. A simple economy of consulting and ministerial resources was possible. 
Handling a sector would be only slightly more difficult than handling one firm. 
The economies of  scale come in several forms: (a)  Marketing of companies 
to potential investors is more efficient. Industrial trade shows can be visited, 
advertisements in trade journals can be combined, and so on. (b)  Industry stud- 
ies,  both  domestic and foreign, are  a  necessary  part  of  a  serious  single- 
company analysis. (c) Someone must oversee each consultant contract within 
the MOP. It helps to have one contract for several companies. As discussed 
above, the difficulty in finding a person able and willing to accept responsibil- 
ity for a deal cannot be overestimated. The sector approach  was to provide 
structure and help for MOP officials. 
2. The bargaining  position  vis  A vis  the foreign  investor  was seen to be 
18. For example, at one point, the MOP wanted to conduct a competitive tender for an important 
enterprise with two interested foreign buyers, one Japanese and  one British. After a long and 
disastrous meeting between ministry representatives and the management, on  the one hand, and 
the Japanese potential investors, on the other, the Japanese went home for good. Only then did the 
ministry officials notice that the management team was wearing the company ties of the British 
firm. 177  The Logistics of Privatization in Poland 
stronger. The investor could no longer go from company to company seeking 
the best deal. 
3. The bargaining  position vis-A-vis the company would be stronger. The 
MOP is equipped with perhaps more information  than the managers  them- 
selves and can explain why the firm needs to be a part of the privatization. The 
ability to sit down with representatives of the entire industry and threaten them 
that if  they do not  get on board, they  will lose out to their colleagues  and 
competitors has turned out to be effective in getting firms to volunteer. 
4. Sectoral studies could in principle help inform industrial policy. 
5. Certain policies that affect all the firms in an industry could in principle be 
carefully formulated and applied, such as treatment of environmental liability. 
Sectoral studies are under way in some twenty  sectors. One, in the deter- 
gents sector, has been more or less completed. This project was initiated be- 
cause of foreign expressions of interest in particular companies. After some 
nine months, the result has been that most of the firms involved in the study 
have been dealt with in some fashion. The best three were sold for what minis- 
try officials perceived to be much better prices than would otherwise have been 
obtained. Other sectoral projects have resulted in studies with little other action 
so far, although perhaps forty transactions  are in some stage of  preparation. 
Five transactions have been carried out as of the end of 199 1,  all trade sales to 
foreign investors. 
In general, however, the goals of the sectoral approach have yet to be real- 
ized. Heavy reliance on foreigners and consultants may have caused a public 
backlash against selling companies “too cheaply” to foreigners. More gener- 
ally, it remains a question whether much can be done except to sell good com- 
panies to foreigners, something that Western investment banks do know how 
to do. On balance, while the sectoral approach seems to be a sensible way to 
conduct some foreign trade sales and can provide some useful information to 
the ministry, it is not in itself going to accelerate greatly the overall privatiza- 
tion process. 
Privatization through Liquidation 
Liquidation is the second main path of  privatization envisaged in the 1 Au- 
gust 1990 Privatization Law. It was designed to facilitate a decentralized and 
“bottom-up” process, whereby interested enterprises could take the initiative 
to privatize themselves,subject to certain constraints, but with the possibility 
of lease financing from the Treasury. 
This type of privatization has been by far the most common, despite receiv- 
ing much less attention in the public (and especially foreign-language) debate, 
and although the MOP resources devoted to this path have been relatively mini- 
mal.19 Although the law allows for three mechanisms for liquidation, in prac- 
19. This is in part  because small firms,  typically the ones that  undergo this sort privatization, 
represent a relatively small part of  Polish industry. For example, the  largest 413 enterprises em- 
ployed in 1989 account for 45 percent of all workers in industry. 178  Andrew Berg 
tice 8  1 percent of transactions have followed the leasing method: the creation 
of a new private company whose shareholders are the workers and managers 
and that leases the assets of the state enterprise. This follows from the “bottom- 
up” nature of the process: insiders try this, in general, only if they want to own 
their firm. (Tables 13.1 and 13.2 above present the size and sectoral breakdown 
for liquidated enterprises.) 
In a typical transaction, the management and workers of a small and promis- 
ing firm decide to privatize. They hire a consultant, approved by the MOP, who 
does a valuation of the company. The legal status of the assets and liabilities of 
the state enterprise is determined (land ownership etc.). When the responsible 
branch ministry and finally the MOP agree, the liquidation begins. The work- 
ers and managers form a new company and put in the start-up capital as re- 
quired by the law. Often a “rich uncle,” perhaps a foreign investor, helps pro- 
vide the money. If no one objects, such as rival claimants for the assets or the 
local government, the MOP is likely to approve the liquidation. These transac- 
tions  require  months  of  strenuous  effort,  although,  unlike  capital  priva- 
tizations, most of the work is done by the enterprise or the consultants it hires. 
An important uncertainty exists as to how many of these deals have actually 
been  completed. Some 416 liquidations  have  achieved final ministerial  ap- 
proval. However, only 154 have reached the final step, in which the state enter- 
prise is crossed off the books. It appears that a variety of problems can arise to 
complicate the final closure of the deal. First, property claims turn out to be 
multiple and conflicting, or at least difficult to disentangle.2” Second, the new 
private company,  which  may  already  be  operating and benefiting  from the 
state-enterprise assets by the time the ministerial agreement is given, may try 
to renegotiate the terms of its lease. 
There are some potential problems with these liquidation privatizations. The 
companies may be overleveraged if the initial valuations were too high. The 
companies may be betting that the government will not want to reclaim the 
assets or that they will be able to appropriate the assets before this happens. 
The anecdotal evidence of excessively burdensome leases may, of course, re- 
flect managerial  attempts to force renegotiation  of  terms. The ministry  has 
been worried, however, that the enterprises would be so burdened by debt pay- 
ments that they would not be able to invest. 
Important early evidence suggests that firms that undergo this type of priva- 
tization engage in active and positive restructuring. They change pay scales, 
reduce the work force, find partners, and so on. This seems to happen through- 
20. An example of the kind of  tangled property claims that can cause problems may  illustrate 
the point. A private-sector supplier of plumbing (the “toilet king”) during the late  1980s gained 
control over the parking lot to a major hotel outside a major town. He apparently made a deal 
according to which he supplied fixtures to the hotel in return for some sort of concession to the 
(only available) parking lot. He is currently charging a few dollars to each hotel guest to park 
there. This hotel could not be liquidated without first clarifying the legal status of this contract. 179  The Logistics of Privatization in Poland 
out the process, not only at the end, implying a confidence that the assets will 
eventually be privatized. 
There are few signs of  social or political resistance to these transactions, 
perhaps as a result  of  its “bottom-up” nature, although  some people  in the 
MOP are bothered by the idea that insiders are appropriating state assets too 
cheaply. In conclusion, this is a privatization method that seems to accommo- 
date itself to existing stakeholders. With the caveats mentioned above, it seems 
to be proceeding fairly rapidly, without enormous ministerial effort.2’ 
Bankruptcy 
The second most common path to the transformation of a state enterprise, 
after liquidation and workedmanagement  buyout, is liquidation according to 
the State Enterprise Law of  1981, a form of  bankruptcy. This method  is in- 
tended for firms that are in arrears to the government, which thereby gains the 
legal right to appoint a liquidator to sell off the assets and pay off creditors. A 
liquidator has begun work on some 534 mostly small firms, with an average 
employment of about 250, since the passage of the privatization law in  1990. 
Only a few of these liquidations have been completed.22 
There is also a German-style bankruptcy law that gives creditors or the firm 
the option to begin bankruptcy proceedings in court. Given the general macro- 
economic climate and financial outcomes in state enterprises, one would ex- 
pect a large number of these bankruptcies. It is outside the scope of this paper 
to discuss why, in practice, virtually none have occurred, but the logistical and 
institutional  difficulties  involved  in  applying  long-dormant  laws  are  over- 
whelming. 
Mass Privatization 
The inclusion of a discussion of  mass privatization  in a paper concerned 
with the experience of privatization is somewhat premature, as no companies 
have actually been privatized through this method. The constraints discussed 
in this paper have, however, shaped the ongoing preparation of the program.23 
21. One attractive alternative to the workerhanagement leasing approach for small companies 
would be simply to hold an auction. A desire to avoid excessive leverage, to find active outside 
owners, and to get better prices led the ministry to try this approach in 1991. Very few auction 
transactions have been carried out. Often, only one bidder has emerged, and this sole bidder may 
turn out to be a manager from the firm  or a partner in the consulting company that handled the 
valuation. Examples like this help explain why some in the ministry consider that the most appro- 
priate firms for auctions are the ones that come to the ministry begging for help, desiring only to 
avoid bankruptcy: these are the firms that the insiders do not much want and that therefore will 
not take care of themselves. 
22. Tables  13.1 and 13.2 above present the size and sectoral breakdown for enterprises liqui- 
dated through the 1981 State Enterprise Law. 
23. Discussion of  the design of large-scale free giveaway privatization programs has a fairly 
long history, however. Among the many papers on free giveaways in Poland are Szomburg and 180  Andrew Berg 
Therefore, the following briefly outlines the program as it appears to be devel- 
oping, reviews some of the choices that have been made, addresses unresolved 
questions, and then asks why it has taken so long to implement.24 
1. The program aims to involve some 200-600  companies, at least initially. 
A plausible estimate would be that these companies will average about 1,000 
employees per company, so even this first tranche could amount to more than 
10 percent of employment in industry. These companies will be commercial- 
ized  over  the  next  few  months  (some  150 have  already  been  completed). 
Thirty-seven Polish consulting companies coordinated by a major international 
accounting firm are preparing informational packets on each enterprise to be 
involved in the program. 
2. Ten to twenty financial intermediaries  (“funds”)  are to be created. The 
funds will be joint-stock companies under the Polish commercial code, similar 
in some respects to American closed-end mutual funds. Their shares will be 
distributed to the Polish population,  the ultimate owners. Their initial board 
will be appointed by the MOP. The first shareholder’s meeting  will be held 
and the board subject to reelection perhaps after the 1992 books are audited, 
in 1993. 
3. The funds will choose and sign contracts with fund management compa- 
nies, with the assistance of the MOP. The fund managers will have responsibil- 
ity for all day-to-day management of the fund and its portfolio. The manage- 
ment contracts will contain strong incentive clauses to minimize dependence 
on initial valuations. 
4. Each fund will be the lead shareholder in some ten to twenty companies, 
holding a 33 percent stake, and will hold much smaller pieces, say 2-3  percent, 
of  many more enterprises. The method of distributing  the companies to the 
funds has not been made clear. It may involve some sort of auction (for “bid- 
ding points,” not real money) or a random allocation. 
5. Workers in the enterprises involved will receive free of charge 10 percent 
of the shares in their firm (up to a limit of one year’s wage worth of equity at 
book value). 
6. The funds will be able to buy and sell shares in their portfolios soon after 
they begin operation, subject to approval of the Anti-Monopoly Commission. 
They will be responsible for appointment and oversight of board members for 
the companies in their portfolio. They will be given special responsibility for 
the companies in which they are the lead shareholder. 
7. The mechanisms for the transfer of  the shares of the funds to the popula- 
tion are still under active discussion and investigation. One plausible  option 
Lewandowski (1990),  Lipton and Sachs (1991),  and Frydman and Rapaczynski (1992). Implemen- 
tation had been prepared in earnest since S.  G. Warburg was appointed adviser on mass privatiza- 
tion to the MOP. 
24. At the time of writing, the timing for the program was still uncertain, as the enabling legisla- 
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involves the creation  of  a  single “program  share” that would represent  one 
share in each fund in the program. These shares would be distributed to the 
population  (or sold for a small fee) and would be tradable over the counter. 
When a large number (for example, twenty) of the shares are taken to a li- 
censed broker, they would be registered and “broken out” into the individual 
fund shares, which would be traded on the stock exchange. Dividends would 
not be distributed and proxy voting disallowed until the shares had been broken 
out. This potential solution has the advantage that it significantly reduces trans- 
action costs associated with trading, payment of dividends, shareholder rela- 
tions, and so on in the initial period.25  Shares in the funds may be distributed 
somehow as an alternative to wage or pension payments for public-sector em- 
ployees. 
This brief description suggests that a large number of issues remain unde- 
cided. Among the more important questions are how to guarantee sufficient 
autonomy of  management companies, how  to manage trading  of  the large 
number  of  shares and, possibly,  dividend  payments,  and how  to handle  the 
incentive contract if the fund decides to terminate the current fund manage- 
ment contract prematurely. 
Many important questions appear to have been settled, however. I will con- 
centrate on one: the “top-down’’ versus “bottom-up” creation of  the funds. A 
central question faced early in the design of the program involved whether the 
funds should be created by the government or whether they should be allowed 
to develop spontaneously. Approaches similar to the current Czechoslovak ap- 
proach were actively  discussed in Poland. In this type of plan, vouchers are 
distributed to the population, who then are encouraged to choose an intermedi- 
ary institution  in which to invest the voucher. The intermediary, competing 
with  other intermediaries  for the  voucher,  can  choose the  enterprise  of  its 
choice for the initial investment. 
The decision to reject this idea in Poland was made to minimize complexity. 
It was decided that the construction  of a system that could reliably and in a 
reasonably fraud-free way distribute and redeem vouchers would be costly and 
risky, and perhaps impossible. The benefits of a more spontaneous creation of 
intermediaries by individuals were not considered to be worth the risk of large- 
scale confusion, chaos, and fraud. The ministry decided that relying on tested 
and reputable fund-management companies in the early stages would be more 
reliable than trusting the uninformed choice of voucherholders. In this model, 
shareholders would exercise choice later, as their share in the funds became 
tradable. 
A potentially  unfortunate upshot of this choice, however, and perhaps the 
major reason for the cautious approach taken so far toward mass privatization 
plans, is the risk of excess “centralization” perceived by  some (such as, e.g., 
25. Of course, if it were politically acceptable randomly to allocate each citizen to one specific 
fund, this would further simplify the process. 182  Andrew Berg 
Frydman  and  Rapaczynski  1992).26  The government  essentially  creates the 
funds at first and by  default must  appoint  the first board  of  directors,  who 
are subject only to the indirect discipline of diffuse shareownership and legal 
obligations. It was judged that this would be an effective way  of  leveraging 
scarce government energies and that it would be possible to create a small 
number of quality boards. 
Related to the “top-down’’ nature of fund creation is the need to decide on 
the  structure  of  the  intermediaries.  If  voucherholders  simply  decided  with 
whom to invest, the government could avoid deciding whether the funds should 
more  closely  resemble  holding  companies, mutual  funds,  venture  capital 
funds, or whatever. In the event, the proportion of shares going to the funds as 
outlined  above  was  judged  to  provide  a  sufficiently  active  owner  while 
avoiding some of the risks of excessive concentration of power. 
Most  of  the  other outstanding  implementation  issues can be worked  out 
through pragmatic and careful analysis of options and discussion with potential 
fund managers. Three, however, are arguably more serious. Until now, the min- 
istry has not used its powers to force the commercialization of state enterprises. 
Instead,  it has relied  on enterprises  to volunteer  for commercialization  and 
specifically for mass privatization. Given the above discussion about incentives 
for insiders to attempt to preserve current rents where they exist, a concern 
about negative self-selection is logical. 
It is not entirely clear that all the difficulties associated with capital priva- 
tizations have been resolved for mass privatization. One of the goals of mass 
privatization is to avoid having to construct each privatization  separately, but 
some firm-specific issues may have to be addressed. For example, it may be 
necessary to unravel unclear property claims and decide on the disposition of 
social assets currently controlled by the enterprise. Another example is pro- 
vided by the problem of  environmental liability. Blanket indemnification for 
past damages usually requires an environmental audit at the time of transfer of 
assets, a time-consuming process. On the other hand, the absence of indemni- 
fication may expose the funds to excessive future risk. 
The final question concerns the political acceptance of foreign involvement 
and of the program in general. Recent events, and some survey results, suggest 
that understanding and acceptance have grown and that the new Sejm is seri- 
ously addressing itself to remaining questions. Furthermore, the difficult situa- 
tion for state enterprises has muted objections to temporary “centralization” of 
control and has perhaps focused debate on how to improve the situation for the 
state enterprises. On the other hand, the recent elections have witnessed some 
26. The current, somewhat decentralized control structure has some advantages that could be 
threatened by  a strengthening of  direct government responsibility for the firm.  There is the risk 
that the firms become even more passive than they currently are as workers and managers wait for 
the government to “save” them. Finally, the budget might come under even greater pressure if 
the government were less able to claim that it had no responsibility for wage setting in  a given 
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resurgence of nationalism and doubts about foreign involvement in the econ- 
omy. At the time of writing, mass privatization seems to have renewed political 
momentum and a good chance of going forward. 
Why, then, is mass privatization taking so long to set in motion? On the one 
hand, the program has numerous potential advantages in light of the constraints 
mentioned above. It avoids some of the problems of valuation, finds owners 
for a huge number of firms, includes free distribution to insiders, but also pre- 
vents them from taking all the assets. It should mobilize resources in a decen- 
tralized way to restructure large numbers of enterprises, leveraging ministry 
energy through the funds. On the other hand, it is both a novel and a complex 
operation, involving to date some four foreign advisery firms, tens of  Polish 
consulting companies, and  much  technical  and political  effort. Legal, eco- 
nomic, and political issues have to be carefully coordinated. Many decision 
makers felt a strong disinclination to increase government involvement in the 
enterprises, after years of struggling for decentralization. Difficult choices have 
presented themselves at each step in the design of the program. The alternative 
of taking a little more time to reflect and gather information has always been 
attractive. The lack of  examples has been decisive in encouraging this extra 
care.27  The program also has an important all-or-nothing feature: the critical 
mass of companies included needs to be large enough that the value of the 
fund shares is not ridiculous. Finally, such a complex plan requires the several 
ministries, political leaders, and the population to mobilize behind a basically 
confusing agenda. 
13.3  Conclusion 
Two years after the “big bang,” 11 percent of Polish state enterprises have 
been commercialized or privatized. This paper has reviewed attempts at imple- 
menting privatization in Poland. In doing so, it has highlighted how difficult 
the process is and explained some of the reasons for this difficulty. The over- 
throw of the Communist regime, marketization of the economy, and legal and 
political revolution have changed all the “rules of the game,” and in this envi- 
ronment the complexity of  the privatization  task overwhelms administrative 
capacity, Moreover, privatization requires a widespread rearranging of ambigu- 
ous property rights. It is not clear who owns the firm, who is responsible for 
liabilities, and in particular what power remains with the state. The result has 
been  a confused political  debate, a paralyzed  bureaucracy,  and  enterprises 
whose workers and managers control the enterprise without any certain long- 
term stake in the firm. 
We can characterize privatization strategies into three broad categories. The 
first, followed by Poland in 1990, stresses the careful creation of capital mar- 
27. Stabilization programs are also complex and risky to implement. However, the existence of 
various worked-out examples simplifies the design of a new program. 184  Andrew Berg 
kets and case-by-case “top-down’’ privatization  of state enterprises. This has 
essentially failed. The second emphasizes the organic  growth of the private 
sector, perhaps augmented with spontaneous privatization (see Kornai  199 1  ). 
It may indeed be that the Polish economy will evolve over decades into a mar- 
ket economy without privatization  of the large state enterprises. Indeed, the 
private sector is growing at a phenomenal rate, and liquidations of small enter- 
prises seem to be proceeding fairly rapidly. The deep risks of this strategy are 
now evident, however. The deteriorating financial situation of state enterprises 
is  leading  to large  and growing  budget  deficits. A  macroeconomic relapse 
would  endanger the growing private sector just as it threatens  to move into 
manufacturing. 
The third broad strategy is exemplified by  the mass privatization program 
and emphasizes large-scale and widespread free distribution of equity through 
intermediary institutions. Much preparatory work has now been done, and im- 
plementation  should soon begin, although parliamentary  support has not yet 
been forthcoming. It is possible that this novel approach, designed with East 
European  constraints in mind, may succeed where traditional methods have 
failed. 
In retrospect, excess caution has been exercised in choosing the best possible 
scheme for mass privatization. It is difficult to imagine a plan whose imple- 
mentation would have left the situation in the state enterprises worse than it is 
now. It may have been possible early on to act decisively and avoid much of 
the fragility of the current economic and political situation. A window of op- 
portunity may have closed: the political honeymoon of the post-Communist era 
is over, and the financial predicament of the state sector continues to worsen. It 
is possible that the political system will manage to provide an environment that 
allows the private sector to continue to grow steadily. Unless mass privatization 
takes place, however, the risk of continued economic and political stability will 
be greiat. 
Appendix 
Table 13A.1  Individual Enterprises Privatized through Capital Privatization as of 
31 December 1991 
Value of Shares Sold 
Name of Enterprise  Value (billion 21)  Method of Sale  (billion ZI) 
Exbud S. A.  1 12.00  IPO 
Slaska F-K  70.00  IPO 
Kablis S.  A. 
Prochnik S. A.  75.00  IPO 
Tonsil S. A.  120.00  IPO 
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Table 13A.1  (continued) 
Value of Shares Sold 
Name of Enterprise  Value (billion Z1)  Method of Sale  (billion ZI) 
Fampa S.  A. 
Zminowroc 
Budokor Sp. Zoo. 
Norblin S. A. 
Polam Pila S.  A. 
Pollena 
Wolczanka S. A. 
Swarzedz S. A. 
Huta Szkla 
Zywiec S.  A. 
Ekomel Sp. Zoo. 
E. Wedel S. A. 
Mostostal S.  A. 
Famet S. A. 
Pol-Baf S. A. 
Techma Sp. Zoo 
Krakbud Sp. Zoo. 
Kaprinz Sp. Zoo. 
Pollena 
Pollena S. A. 
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Source: Ministry of Privatization, Warsaw 
Nure: IPO = initial public offering; public tender = public tender of enterprise or portion thereof 
(this normally refers to a “trade sale” to foreign investors). 
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Discussion Summary 
Tom Kolaja discussed many of the practical problems that have handicapped 
the privatization process in Poland. First, he noted that the Ministry of Priva- 
tization has had difficulty attracting qualified personnel because of large wage 
differentials between the private and the public sectors. Kolaja said that private 
consultants earn ten to twenty times as much as equally qualified state employ- 187  The Logistics of Privatization in Poland 
ees. Second, Kolaja noted that many of the high-ranking officials in the minis- 
tries have come from the reform  movement and hence have limited profes- 
sional experience as politicians or bureaucrats. Third, he said that civil servants 
are criminally liable for any mistake they make during the privatization pro- 
cess. This explains why many decisions are avoided or delayed by being passed 
up the ministerial hierarchy. Finally,  Kolaja observed that costly uncertainty 
has been generated by a lack of coordination among the myriad Polish regula- 
tory agencies. 
Kolaja also discussed the proposed program of  mass privatization. He sup- 
ports this approach, but he noted two potential hurdles that it will face. First, 
the Polish ministries must clarify whether and how environmental  liabilities 
will be carried over from old to new firms. Second, the ministries must estab- 
lish how much control the new owners will have. For example, he wondered 
whether the new owners will be able to carry out mass layoffs. 
Jucek Rostowski noted that commercialization is often initially perceived by 
managers as a means by which firms can acquire additional government sup- 
port instead of as an intermediate step to privatization. He cited examples in 
which newly commercialized firms had requested favors from the government 
officials who were serving on their boards. Rostowski warned that it usually 
takes at least two years before the boards of these commercialized companies 
start functioning in ways that correspond to the boards of Western firms. 
Simon Johnson contrasted the Polish and Czechoslovak privatization experi- 
ences. First, he noted that the Czechoslovak voucher program had provided a 
much more successful “packaging of capitalism” than had been achieved by 
the  various  Polish  privatization  programs.  Second, Johnson  said  that,  in 
Czechoslovakia, all managers had been forced to submit privatization plans, 
thereby giving the privatization process a strong start. 
Kulman Mizsei noted that delays in the privatization process in Czechoslova- 
kia, Hungary, and Poland have been very costly to the governments because 
the market value of  enterprises  has fallen significantly during the last three 
years. He added that privatization programs should include an aggressive effort 
to attract foreign capital, as is currently being done in Hungary. He also praised 
Hungary’s support for “self-privatization,’’ a program in which privatization of 
small- to mid-sized firms is achieved with minimal interference by  the State 
Property Agency. 
Murk Schuffer suggested that the Kornai strategy for privatization-organic 
growth  of  the  private  sector without  active efforts to privatize  state-owned 
firms-might  be a more successful strategy than the proposed plan of mass 
privatization. Schaffer warned that mass privatization may not solve the prob- 
lem of growing demands for government subsidies and bailouts; newly privat- 
ized state firms will still generate such demands. Moreover, Schaffer stressed 
that the program of mass privatization will be fairly complicated, time consum- 
ing, and costly. 
Stanley Fischer  wondered  whether  the  paper  had  taken  a view  that  was 188  Andrew Berg 
overly pessimistic. He suggested that potential changes in the commercializa- 
tion  laws, of the type proposed  in the paper by  Andrei  Shleifer and Robert 
Vishny (chap. 12 in this volume), would improve the prospects for commercial- 
ization. Geoffrey Carliner wondered whether Kolaja’s comments were also too 
pessimistic.  He asked if  Kolaja’s description of  the difficulties plaguing  the 
Ministry of Privatization was intended to suggest that privatization company 
by company has been a total failure. 
Jeffrey  Sachs  argued  in  favor  of  privatization  programs  that  work  more 
quickly than the company-by-company approach that Poland has used so far. 
Sachs pointed out that the failure of  the Polish approach was predicted. There 
were not enough skilled people in the privatization ministries to privatize each 
of the 3,000 industrial firms in Poland on a case-by-case basis. Sachs argued 
that the Poles need a privatization  system that will operate more quickly, even 
if this leads to a less controlled and careful privatization process. He empha- 
sized that case-by-case privatization  is politically painful and extraordinarily 
time consuming and that it leads to charges of corruption with every deal. By 
contrast, a more aggressive program in which firms are turned over to insiders 
would  operate  quickly  through  a  relatively  decentralized  mechanism  and 
would align the interests of workers with the privatization process. 
Andrew Berg responded to Schaffer’s criticism of mass privatization. Berg 
conceded that there are unresolved questions about whether the new  invest- 
ment funds will insulate  the government from demands for subsidies  from 
newly privatized firms. However, Berg emphasized that the newly privatized 
firms will have the right allocative incentives with regard to whatever resources 
they end up controlling. Berg argued that it is much better to give resources/ 
subsidies to an enterprise that is using them efficiently than it is to use subsid- 
ies to preserve structures that really should die. 